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Origins of the Social Mind is a collection of papers that
unites the latest empirical ﬁndings and conceptual insights
from cognitive development, and primate and avian cog-
nition, written by some of the leading researchers in the
respective ﬁelds. As the editors mention in the preface,
there has recently been a trend for transdisciplinary coop-
eration among primatologists and developmental psychol-
ogists—and this is one of the few anthologies that provides
an excellent representation of this rapprochement.
One striking aspect is the great diversity that is covered
in terms of the species investigated (ranging from corvids,
parrots, monkeys, and apes to humans), age groups tested
(from infants to adults), and research methods employed
(from naturalistic observations to experiments and inter-
views). Importantly, this variability does not result in
unrelated pieces that lack a common topical focus; quite
the contrary, the reader quickly identiﬁes the recurring
themes in this book to be cooperation, competition, and
communication in the animal kingdom and human life.
Origins of the Social Mind comprises nine chapters and
a closing commentary by one of the editors, Shoji Itakura.
The chapters are organized into two parts. The ﬁrst part
(Chaps. 1–5) deals with the phylogeny of cooperative
activities, maternal behaviors, and various ‘‘mind-reading’’
abilities. The second part (Chaps. 6–9, plus commentary)
revolves around the development of various social–cogni-
tive abilities in humans. Interestingly, the majority of these
chapters deal with skills that are not among the usual
suspects in the literature about theory of mind and related
topics, namely: negotiating with others to achieve a con-
sensus, impression management, and ‘‘acting as if’’ in the
context of performance art.
Part 1: Phylogeny of social cognition
One noteworthy aspect is the emphasis that is placed on
ecological validity throughout the ﬁrst part of the book.
The animals in the experiments were not confronted with
tasks that seem to have been designed for human subjects.
Instead, animals were tested in very natural scenarios, such
as competing with others over valuable resources (mon-
keys, Chap. 1), caching food to protect it from potential
pilferers (corvids, Chap. 3), and coordinating behaviors
with others to make resources accessible that cannot be
obtained by individual action alone (parrots, Chap. 5).
The journey begins with a rich amalgam of studies
with capuchin monkeys, Cebus apella, conducted at the
Primate Research Institute in Kyoto. Kazuo Fujita, Hika
Kuroshima, Yuko Hattori, and Makoto Takahashi report
some impressive results showing traces of deceptive
behavior, cooperation, and knowledge attribution in these
monkeys. The fact that New World monkeys display such
sophisticated forms of social cognition may lead to a
reconsideration of the phylogenetic onset of these skills. It
may also generate a line of research that aims to identify
and compare the speciﬁc ways in which the different
species approach these tasks, as well as the kind and
amount of training that is required for them to succeed in
these tests.
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DOI 10.1007/s10329-009-0145-2In Chap. 2, Satoshi Hirata gives a sensible and
thoughtful description of early dyadic interactions between
chimpanzee mothers and their infants—both in the wild
and in captivity. One may expect core maternal behaviors
such as nursing and protecting the young to be in-built and
stable across different environmental conditions. However,
as Hirata demonstrates in his examples, chimpanzees who
were raised by humans can be challenged by these basic
maternal tasks to a degree that they seek help from humans.
An important question that these observations raise is
whether this seeking of assistance reﬂects a lack of critical
learning experiences acquired in the wild, or if human-
reared primates build special relations with the humans that
allow them to accept these humans as caregivers for their
child.
Moving from dyadic to triadic engagement in Chap. 3,
James Anderson and Sarah-Jane Vick give an interesting
review of gaze understanding in the primate species. They
provide a ﬁne-grained picture of the state of the art and
point at the relevance of factors such as rank, socioecology,
upbringing, and the speciﬁcs of the experimental setup.
One interesting phenomenon is a dissociation found in
apes, but not humans; whereas apes seem unable to use
their gaze understanding in communicative scenarios, such
as the object choice task, human infants quickly learn that
another may use his gaze to give them a hint or a wink. The
authors’ analyses will hopefully foster many more research
projects looking at this and other questions revolving
around eye contact, gaze, and their meaning in different
species and contexts.
Nathan Emery and Nicola Clayton from the Cambridge
Avian Cognition group remind us in Chap. 4 of the
shortcomings of any anthropo- or primatocentric bias in
comparative psychology. Birds’ cognitive capacities have
long been underestimated, partly due to a misconception of
the structure of their brains. The series of experiments
reported by Emery and Clayton suggest that Western
scrub-jays preferably cache food in places that are (1)
shady (versus well lit), (2) distant from (versus close to) an
onlooker and potential pilferer, and (3) not visible (versus
visible) for another individual. Food items that have been
cached in ‘‘risky places’’ are relocated to safer places at a
later time. Irrespective of whether these data speak in favor
of a theory of mind in these corvids, they certainly dem-
onstrate a level of social-cognitive skills that many did not
expect.
With a similar emphasis on the relevance of ecological
validity, Ludwig Huber, Gyula Gajdon, Ira Federspiel, and
Dagmar Werdenich in Chap. 5 report some clever experi-
ments with kea. These parrots live in steep, alpine habitats
with limited access to resources—with the effect that
cooperative strategies may be highly beneﬁcial. In a
number of experiments with various problem-solving
scenarios, the researchers found that dominant birds
‘‘coerced’’ subordinate individuals into manipulating
apparatuses such that the dominants could obtain the food
reward. Future research should be aimed at identifying role
reversal and situations in which two or more individuals
truly have to work together (instead of one individual
having to do all the work, while the other awaits the
reward) to ﬁnd out if kea can go beyond what the authors
oxymoronically call ‘‘coercive cooperation.’’
Part 2: Ontogeny of social cognition
This part begins with an interesting chapter by Hanae Ando
and Masuo Koyasu about some surprising differences in
the acting skills of novices and expert actors. Not so sur-
prising is the ﬁnding that adults evaluated the performances
by professionals as generally better in quality and more
realistic than those by novices. However, there was one
striking piece of ﬁnding: novices outperformed experts in
scenes in which they had to act as a person who is pre-
tending to be in pain rather than simply a person in pain.
The audience was unable to tell the difference between
these two cases when the actors were experts, but had no
problem perceiving the difference when the actors were
novices. It thus seems that having received extensive
training in ‘‘acting as if’’ makes it hard for experts to
convey one thing on stage: namely ‘‘acting as if’’—possi-
bly because they have become so convincingly good at it
that it cannot be distinguished from reality.
In Chap. 7, Philippe Rochat and Cla ´udia Passos Ferreira
identify as the differentia speciﬁca the ability of humans to
negotiate with others. According to this view, Homo
sapiens is not characterized best as rational animal or zoon
logon echon,b u ta sHomo negotiatus, who seeks to arrive
at agreements with others. Objects of negotiation are not
just the values of things etc., but also one’s self-image as
seen through the looking glass (Cooley 1902). Therefore,
the ability to bargain and negotiate is tied to a particular
sense of self—a self that is aware of its being subjected to
others’ judgments and evaluations and that cares about its
reputation. The roots of negotiation and self knowledge lie,
so it is argued, in an early sense of ownership and pos-
session emerging at around 2 years of age.
In Chap. 8, Victoria Talwar and Kang Lee take a closer
look at what is mostly considered a misconduct, but needs
to be acknowledged as a signiﬁcant cognitive achievement:
telling lies. Even prior to an understanding of false beliefs,
toddlers between 2 and 3 years sometimes make untrue
statements after having committed a transgression. Soon
thereafter, children also tell ‘‘white’’ lies to conceal another
person’s wrongdoing. However, these initial lies are easily
detected by adults as they are poorly crafted and not well
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abilities advance, children also begin to lie in more mature
and clever ways.
In the last chapter, Shoji Itakura, Mako Okanda, and
Yusuke Moriguchi report a set of interesting studies with
infants in diverse areas of social cognition. Studies include
investigations of young infants’ sensitivity to social con-
tingency, social inﬂuences on preschoolers’ inhibitory
control, and the attribution of dispositional qualities to
geometric ﬁgures. For example, a very valuable control
condition was added to the well-known helper–hinderer
paradigm developed by Kuhlmeier et al. (2003) which has
suggested an ability of infants to attribute dispositional
qualities to others. This new control condition should lead
into a renewed discussion about whether such a high-level
interpretation is warranted, as the infants behaved just as
they did in the experimental condition.
Finally, in his closing commentary, Shoji Itakura pro-
posesanintegrativemodelofsocial–cognitivedevelopment.
Some of the milestones acquired along the way are new-
borns’ preference for faces and a propensity to imitate
shortlyafter birth, followed by joint attention at 9 months of
age, false-belief understanding at 4 years, and an apprecia-
tion of higher-order sarcasm at around 9 years of age.
Overall, Shoji Itakura and Kazuo Fujita edited a valu-
able, interesting book. Its comprehensiveness and the
novelty of the research ensure its appeal to anyone with a
vested interest in the question of how the social mind
develops.
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